Why Wasn’t October 7 Avoided? — A Critical Examination

The article “Why Wasn’t October 7 Avoided?” argues that Israel’s October 7, 2023 Hamas-led offensive—often portrayed as a “surprise attack” or “Israel’s 9/11”—was in many respects foreseeable, and that multiple systemic failures and political choices allowed it to occur. ZNetwork Below, we reconstruct and deepen the argument, supplement with external sources, and assess the broader implications.

The Core Claim: It Was Avoidable

The “Surprise” Narrative vs. Evident Warning Signals

From the outset, the article challenges the dominant narrative that the October 7 assault came from nowhere. Rather, it contends, Israeli authorities had considerable intelligence, observer reports, and local warnings in the months (or even years) leading up to the attack—and chose not to act decisively. Modern Diplomacy+1

Key threads of the argument include:

Ignored Intelligence: Warnings from border sentries, local surveillance units, and foreign intelligence were either dismissed or sidelined. ZNetwork+2Modern Diplomacy+2
Abandoned Hostages: The article highlights the decision-making around the 251 people abducted during the assault, and asserts that the Israeli government’s posture toward those hostages reflected priorities skewed toward using the attack as a political and military lever. ZNetwork+1
Neglected Border Communities: The Israeli settlements and communities adjacent to Gaza (“Gaza envelope”) had been for years deprioritized in defense planning, budget allocations, and security measures. ZNetwork+2Modern Diplomacy+2
Strategic Instrumentalization of the Attack: The article suggests that certain actors in Israel used the aftermath to justify harsh military campaigns, territorial plans, and political consolidation—thus implying a motive to let the attack unfold. Modern Diplomacy+1

Dimensions of Failure: Intelligence, Policy & Culture

To understand how such a breach could happen, we must unpack multiple interlocking domains of failure: intelligence collection/analysis, political decision-making, institutional culture, and strategic assumptions.

Intelligence Warnings & Their Suppression

The article cites testimony from Israeli female border sentry units, who observed unusual activity: people near fences, maps, digging preparations, etc., which they passed up the chain—but their reports were discounted as “routine” or “harmless.” ZNetwork+1
The “Jericho Wall” plan: a 40-page document circulated among Israeli military and intelligence leadership mapped an invasion strategy, including estimated numbers of abductees—very close to the actual assault scale. That document’s existence suggests that key elements of the attack were known (or anticipated) ahead of time. Modern Diplomacy+1
The decision to curtail intelligence on Gaza: after the 2021 Gaza war, Israeli intelligence shifted focus away from Hamas’s tactical capabilities, emphasizing higher-level leadership and strategic targets—thereby blunting early warning capacities. ida.org+2csis.org+2
Organizational barriers: dissenting analytic voices were marginalized, information-sharing across agencies was weak, and hierarchical culture stifled alternative assessments. ida.org+1

An independent article from the CTC at West Point describes the failure not as a single lapse but as an accumulation of analytical blind spots, cognitive biases, overreliance on technology, misestimation of Hamas’s capabilities, and flawed threat prioritization. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

Policy Choices & Prioritization

The article points out that political decision-makers deprioritized the security of border settlements adjacent to Gaza. Over years, funding for “confrontation-line communities” was cut, and protective infrastructure was neglected. ZNetwork+2Modern Diplomacy+2
The “Iron Wall” border barrier—both above and below ground—was heavily relied upon, yet its builder had warned as early as 2018 that it was not sufficient to stop a mass assault unless accompanied by adequate military deployment. On October 7, the barrier was breached at some 44 points. csis.org+4ZNetwork+4juancole.com+4
Political culture and strategy: the article suggests that the Israeli government may have deemed the security environment tolerable, betting on deterrence and the assumption that Hamas lacked ambition for a large-scale ground assault. Whenever signals contradicted this assumption, they were downgraded. ida.org+3Modern Diplomacy+3ZNetwork+3
The article raises the possibility that certain actors saw strategic or political benefit in an attack of this magnitude—fueling mobilization, providing justification for hardline measures, and discrediting moderates. Modern Diplomacy+1

The Hostage Dimension & The “Hannibal Directive”

In the confusion of the October 7 incursion, the article discusses the controversial Hannibal Directive—an Israeli operational doctrine that permits lethal force to prevent soldier abductions, even if hostages are endangered. Some testimonies claim that Israeli forces may have used that doctrine that day in ways that harmed hostages. ZNetwork+1
The appointment of Gal Hirsch, previously implicated in security failures and controversies, to coordinate hostage affairs is critiqued as a symbolic rather than genuinely strategic choice. ZNetwork
According to investigations and media reports, the Shin Bet later acknowledged that had it acted differently—especially regarding warnings and information flow—the massacre might have been avoidable. The Times of Israel

Corroborating Evidence & External Analyses

While the ZNet article presents a more politically charged narrative, many of its factual claims find resonance in independent analyses:

A Shin Bet internal investigation concluded that warning signs, like activation of Hamas-linked SIM cards, were not escalated appropriately, and that clearer protocols or responsibility demarcation might have changed outcomes. The Times of Israel
Scholars note that Israeli political and intelligence leaders had long fixed narratives about Hamas’s limited threat, and consistently marginalized reports that challenged the dominant view. ida.org+2csis.org+2
An institutional study by IDC (Israel’s intelligence community) emphasizes that resource allocation had shifted away from Gaza, limiting the capacity to detect or disrupt preparations in proximity. ida.org
The CSIS analysis underscores that the complexity and scale of the Hamas plan suggest more than a last-minute surprise: significant coordination, multiple axes of attack (land, sea, rocket), and extensive manpower imply longer preparation. csis.org
The West Point CTC article argues that several structural and cognitive failures—misplaced assumptions, flawed prioritization, groupthink—contributed to the surprise attack. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

Assessing Weaknesses & Counterarguments

While the article’s critique is forceful, a balanced assessment must consider alternative interpretations and possible mitigations:

Uncertainty or Ambiguity in Intelligence
Intelligence often delivers ambiguous or partial signals—not precise forecasts. Decision-makers might have judged the indications too nebulous to justify major reallocation or alert. Indeed, media reports suggest that even Hamas leaders were surprised by how easily their militants breached defenses. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Operational Security & Deception by Hamas
Hamas may have employed effective operational security, clandestine training, and deceptive maneuvers—hiding preparations behind civilian facades, timing actions, and compartmentalizing information. This could reduce detectability.
Institutional Inertia & Risk Aversion
Large bureaucratic and security organizations often resist radical strategic shifts, especially when existing threat assessments have been long entrenched. Decision-makers may have judged escalation as riskier than maintaining the status quo.
Partial Attribution vs. Intentional Design
The more controversial claim—that some actors deliberately allowed the attack for political gain—remains speculative. Independent confirmation is lacking, and motive arguments are vulnerable to counter-claims of conspiracy.
Post-Attack Rationalization
The narrative framing of October 7 as a failure and the subsequent investigations can be influenced by political pressures, retrospective rationalization, or demand for accountability, rather than purely dispassionate forensic truth.

Strategic Implications & Lessons

Assuming that many of the article’s observations are valid, what lessons arise for Israel, its intelligence and defense apparatus, and broader regional security?

Reforming Intelligence Systems & Culture

Create mechanisms that elevate dissenting voices, challenge prevailing narratives, and force scenario-based red-teaming.
Ensure fusion of intelligence between services (IDF, Shin Bet, foreign intelligence) and better dissemination of alert signals.
Reinvest in tactical-level intelligence collection and human intelligence (HUMINT) focused on proximate threats, not just leadership or strategic assets.

Resilience of Border Communities & Civil Defense

Prioritize defense planning for communities adjacent to conflict zones—ensure that infrastructure, early warning systems, and evacuation protocols are robust.
Avoid complacency regarding perceived “safe buffers” or barriers—the “Iron Wall” should be complemented by dynamic military posturing.

Strategic & Political Accountability

Public and independent inquiries (rather than internal or closed reports) may help restore trust and deter recurrence.
Political leaders must resist securitization incentives that exploit surprise attacks for broader strategic or ideological agendas.

Rethinking Deterrence & Threat Assumptions

Avoid underestimating asymmetric adversaries. Groups like Hamas can adopt creative, irregular strategies that upset conventional assumptions.
Do not rely exclusively on technological superiority—complex ground operations require adaptable thinking, not just remote sensing or automation.

The USA Ledger

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